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Abstract— Obligations are mandatory actions that users must 
perform, addressing access control requirements. To ensure that 
such obligations are implemented correctly, an automated and 
systematic testing approach is often recommended. One such 
approach is Model-Based Testing (MBT) that allows defining cost-
effective testing strategies to support rigorous testing via 
automation. In this paper, we present MBT for obligations by
extending the Unified Modeling Language (UML) via a profile 
called the Obligations Profile. Based on the profile, we define a 
modeling methodology utilizing the concepts of Obligations Class 
Diagrams (OCDs) and Obligations State Machines (OSMs), which 
are standard UML Class Diagrams and UML State Machines with 
stereotypes from the Obligations Profile. Our methodology, using 
OCDs and OSMs, is automatically enforced by the validation of 
constraints defined in the profile. To assess the completeness and 
applicability of the profile and methodology, we modeled 47 
obligations from four different systems. The results of our case 
study show that we successfully modeled all the obligations and 
used 75% of the stereotypes that we defined in the profile. 
In addition, using OCDs and OSMs, we automatically generate 
executable test cases using a standard state machine structural 
coverage criterion and common test data generation strategies. 
The effectiveness of generated test cases is assessed using mutation 
analysis on two systems, using mutation operators specifically 
designed for obligation faults. Test case execution killed 75% of 
the mutants and a careful analysis further suggests that more 
sophisticated testing strategies must be defined to further improve 
testing effectiveness. 
Keywords—Obligations. Access control policy. UML profile. 
UML class diagram. UML state machines. Model based testing  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Access control rules are security policies to enable/disable 
the access of users of a system to its resources and are pivotal 
for preserving security properties such as confidentiality, 
integrity, and privacy. Access control requirements 
(implemented as rules) are addressed with obligatory actions 
that must be performed by users. Such obligatory actions are 
commonly referred to as obligations that can be performed 
before, during, or after the enforcement of access rules.  
To ensure the correct implementation of obligations, one 
possible approach is to resort to Model-Based Testing (MBT), 
an approach that is gaining a lot of attention in academia and 
industry [1, 2]. MBT relies on systematic behavior modeling of 
the System Under Test (SUT), at an adequate level of 
abstraction, such as to facilitate the automatic generation of 
executable test cases. Such an approach is also potentially 
applicable for testing obligations, which is the goal of this paper. 
To provide MBT for obligations based on standard modeling 
notations, we developed a UML profile for modeling obligations 
called Obligations Profile. On top of the profile, we defined a 
modeling methodology to use the profile for modeling 
Obligation Class Diagrams (OCDs) and Obligation State 
Machines (OSMs). Both are standard UML Class Diagrams and 
UML State Machines making use of stereotypes from the 
Obligations Profile. An OCD captures state variables, 
operations, and signals required to model the behavior of 
obligations, whereas an OSM models the state-based behavior 
of obligations. The methodology guides the modeling of OCDs 
and OSMs by including well-formedness constraints that can be 
enforced by a tool during modeling, expressed in the Object 
Constraint Language (OCL) [3] and defined on the stereotypes 
of the profile. 
The OCDs and OSMs modeled using the Obligations Profile
are further used to generate executable test cases. As an initial 
step towards test case generation from the profile, we 
implemented the All Transitions coverage criterion [4], along 
with random test data (RD) generation and Equivalence Class 
Partitioning (ECP) using boundary values [1], to obtain 
executable test cases. 
To assess the Obligations Profile and effectiveness of test 
cases generated from OCDs and OSMs, we performed an 
empirical evaluation involving two activities. First, we modeled 
47 obligations of four different systems to assess the 
completeness and applicability of the profile. The results 
showed that we successfully modeled all 47 obligations using 
the profile and noticed that 25% of the stereotypes had not been 
used while modeling the systems. The results suggest that our 
profile is sufficiently complete to model the required types of 
obligations and that 25% of the stereotypes may turn out to be 
unnecessary and we may remove them from the profile in the 
future. In the second activity, we generated executable test cases 
for two systems for which implementations are available. The 
effectiveness of the generated test cases was then assessed using 
mutation analysis, where the implementations of the systems 
were mutated using mutation operators that we specifically 
defined to introduce obligation faults [5]. The results showed 
that, for both target systems, when using ECP for test case 
generation, 75% of mutants were killed across the two systems. 
Though encouraging, this further suggests that we need to define 
more focused testing strategies to further improve the fault 
detection effectiveness.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section II presents the running example of the Medical System 
(MS) that we will use throughout the paper to explain various 
concepts, Section III provides the Obligations Profile, and 
Section IV describes our modeling methodology. In Section V,
we discuss how we generate test cases from OCDs and OSMs 
and Section VI presents the empirical evaluation. The related 
work is discussed in Section VII  and Section VIII concludes the 
paper. 
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II. RUNNING EXAMPLE
In this section, we describe a Medical System (MS) and its 
obligations that will be used as a running example for the 
Obligations Profile. 
MS is an information system, which maintains information 
about doctors and patients in a hospital. The information about 
doctors includes their personal information such as name and 
address, and professional information such as duty, schedule, 
and patient’s information, such as patient’s medical history. 
Hospital records, that include general information about 
hospitals, are also part of MS. MS has three types of users: (1) 
administrators that manage hospital records, (2) doctors who 
manage their own information as well as the records of their 
patients, and (3) patients who are allowed to see their medical 
history. MS has an access control policy that includes access 
rights and obligations, which restrict the access of users to the 
resources of the system.  
III. OBLIGATIONS PROFILE
In this section, we define a UML profile for modeling 
obligations called the Obligations Profile. The profile is defined 
by lightweight extensions of UML.
In general, a UML profile enables the extension of UML for 
different domains and platforms, while avoiding any 
contradictions with UML semantics. Two main approaches for 
profile creation are discussed in the literature [6]. The first 
approach directly implements a profile by defining key concepts 
of a target domain, such as what was done to define SysML [7].
The second approach introduces an intermediate step by first 
creating the conceptual model of the domain concepts before 
creating a profile for the identified concepts. This latter approach 
has been used for defining profiles such as the UML profile for 
Modeling and Analysis of Real-time Embedded Systems 
(MARTE) [8] and the UML Testing Profile (UTP) [9] . 
We used the second approach to define the Obligations 
Profile since it is more systematic as it separates the profile 
creation process into two stages. In the first stage, we develop a 
conceptual model of the domain concepts and their 
relationships. In the second stage, we identify the mapping 
between the main concepts and UML modeling elements and 
define corresponding stereotypes. We also define constraints on 
stereotypes and the relationships between stereotypes.  
A. Conceptual Model for Obligations 
In Fig 1, we present a conceptual model for obligations as a 
UML Class Diagram. Our conceptual model of obligations is 
inspired by the work of Park and Sandhu [10] and the work of 
Elrakaiby et al. [5]. Park and Sandhu [10] categorizes 
obligations related to usage control such as pre, on, and post 
obligations. Elrakaiby et al. [5] defines types of obligations 
based on their state-based behavior such as fulfillment 
obligations, continuous obligations, and persistent obligations. 
The concepts of conceptual model are defined below: 
B. Access Control Policies and Obligations 
An Access Control Policy (ACP) consists of a set of access 
rules and obligations that are conditions restricting the access of 
users on system resources. 
1) Definition 1: An ACP consists of a set of access rules and 
a set of obligations, i.e., ACP = {{Access Rule}, {Obligation}},
where Access Rule = {r1, r2, .., rnr}, nr is the number of access 
rules related to ACP, and ri is either a permission or a 
prohibition. An Access Rule of type permission enables access 
to system resources, whereas a prohibition rule denies such 
access. 
Obligations are commonly defined as actions that users are 
required to take and are necessary for the expression of a variety 
of requirements. For example, obligation actions may be linked 
to: (1) access requests of users, such as a requirement to be 
fulfilled before accessing a resource (Pre obligations), (2) 
essential requirements with an on-going access (On obligations), 
(3) post requirements after accessing a resource (Post
obligations), or (4) satisfying requirements such as 
authorization.   
2) Definition 2: An obligation Ob is a set Ob = {Type, User, 
Object, Action, Context} where Type = {On, Pre, Post, 
Fulfillment, Continuous, Negative, Persistent}.
We categorize obligations into two main types as shown in 
Fig 1: Activation and Enforcement obligations. Activation
obligations are linked with access rules. The Activation type is 
further divided into Pre, On and Post obligations. The actions 
that have to be implemented before allowing an access request 
are called Pre obligations. For example, in MS, a doctor submits 
the report of a patient only when the doctor has access to the 
patient. An On obligation is to be fulfilled while accessing a 
resource. For example, the doctor should submit their patient's 
report everyday as long as the patient has been admitted to the 
hospital. 
The Post obligation is to be satisfied after the access to a
resource is completed. For example, the record of a patient has 
to be deleted two years after the last examination took place.
Enforcement is a concept that is used to categorize 
obligations into Fulfillment, Persistent, Negative and 
Continuous. A Fulfillment obligation is violated if it is not 
satisfied within specific time duration. For example, the 
obligation of a doctor to examine a patient is active until the end 
of the day. If it is not fulfilled in time, it becomes violated and is 
no more active. A Persistent obligation remains active even after 
the deadline is over and a Continuous obligation remains active 
during some activity. For example, a doctor should examine at 
least one patient per his/her shift. Negative obligations are 
equivalent to prohibitions that deny the access of user to some 
resources in the system. An example of Negative obligation is 
when a doctor is forbidden to examine patients with a disease for 
which the doctor is not qualified.   
An obligation has at least one User. For example, one of the 
obligations of MS, named Emergency Call, states that an on-
duty doctor should respond to emergency calls within 60 
seconds after receiving the call. In Emergency Call, the doctor 
is the User, who is responsible to satisfy this obligation. User is 
defined as a set of potential actual users for an obligation. A user 
can be a System or a Human.
An obligation has at least one Object, which is the resource 
on which the obligation is to be performed.  
An Action in an obligation is an activity that the user is 
obliged to perform. In software terms, it is one or more system 
operations that user must perform within a given context. We 
categorize actions in three types: Administrative, Non-
Administrative and Sanction. An Administrative action involves 
management decisions, such as restricting the access rights of a 
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user, while a Non-Administrative action is not related to 
managerial tasks and could be as simple as submitting a report. 
In Emergency Call (MS), the action is to respond to emergency 
and it is a Non-Administrative action. Each obligation should 
have at least one Action. Sanction is an optional Action that is 
applicable only in case of the violation of an obligation. A 
Sanction is either some kind of restriction or another obligation 
to be satisfied as a penalty, such as restricting access to a 
particular service in case of late payment. In MS, an example of 
Sanction is when the doctor will submit a violation of duty report 
if he/she fails to submit the examination report of the patient in 
due time. 
An obligation has a Context that activates or deactivates it. 
In the former case, it is called an Initiation context and in the 
latter, a Violation context. A Context in obligations is either a 
constraint such as a timing constraint or is an event from the 
environment. Most of the obligations have time units, time 
delays, or time intervals depending on the context. For example, 
in LFS Alert in Fig 4, the Initiation context is ‘when the life 
support system fails’ and the Violation context is ‘within 30 
seconds’. 
An obligation may have a Condition attached to it. For 
example, in an obligation such as ‘A customer of a company 
must receive a notice every six months about the privacy policy 
of the company, as long as the customer relationship is not 
terminated’, the obligation ‘A customer in a company must 
receive a notice every six month about the privacy policy of the 
company’ is satisfied only on condition ‘as long as the customer 
relationship is not terminated. 
C. Obligations Profile 
In this section, we present the Obligations Profile. The 
profile diagram is presented in Fig 2 and Fig 3. In these figures, 
we defined stereotypes for Obligations Profile and their 
relationships with UML meta-classes. The left-hand side of Fig 
2 is a representation of the ‹‹Obligation›› stereotype that extends 
from UML State Machine and UML Class meta-classes. The 
stereotypes for various types of obligations are also defined such 
as ‹‹Pre››, ‹‹Post››, ‹‹On››, ‹‹Fulfillment››, ‹‹Persistent››,
‹‹Negative›› and ‹‹Continuous››. The right-hand side of Fig 2
shows the ‹‹Context›› stereotype. A ‹‹Context›› can be applied 
Fig 1 Conceptual Model for Obligations 
Fig 2. ‹‹Obligation›› and ‹‹Context›› stereotypes with their respective meta-classes 
Fig 3.The stereotypes of ‹‹User››, ‹‹Object›› and ‹‹Action›› with their respective meta-classes
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on the following UML meta-classes: Transition, Trigger,
CallEvent, ChangeEvent, TimeEvent, SignalEvent, and 
Constraint. The types of ‹‹Context ›› are ‹‹ Initiation›› and 
‹‹Violation›› contexts and they are also shown in the same 
diagram.  
In Fig 3, the stereotypes for the user of obligation, i.e., 
‹‹Human›› and ‹‹System›› extends the UML meta-class: Class.
The stereotype ‹‹Object›› is also presented in Fig 3 extending the 
UML meta-class Class. The right-hand side of Fig 3 shows the 
‹‹Action›› stereotype that extends from UML meta-classes of 
Operation, CallEvent, ChangeEvent, TimeEvent, SignalEvent,
and Constraint. A ‹‹Action›› is either ‹‹Administrative›› or 
‹‹NonAdministrative›› action.  
In the next step, we present OCL constraints that are part of 
the Obligations Profile, in order to enforce mandatory modeling 
steps. The constraints force modelers to comply with the 
Obligations Profile through automatic enforcement of the 
constraints by the modeling tool. In our case we used IBM 
Rational Software Architect [11]. We have defined ten different 
constraints on the stereotypes in the Obligations Profile, but due 
to space constraints, we show only some of the constraints 
applied on stereotype ‹‹Obligation››. The constraint on 
‹‹Obligation›› shown in Table 1 states that exactly one class 
should be stereotyped as ‹‹Obligation›› in one OCD. The 
constraint on OSM as shown in Table 2 restrict a user to define 
exactly one InActive and exactly one Active state while modeling 
the OSM. 
IV. OBLIGATION MODELING METHODOLOGY
In this Section, we present the methodology to model 
obligations using the Obligations Profile. We precisely define 
OSM and OCD and provide their constraints. 
A. Obligation Class Diagram 
An OCD is a UML Class Diagram with stereotypes defined 
in the Obligations Profile. A detailed definition of OCD is 
provided in Table 3.
B. Obligation State Machine 
An OSM is a UML State Machine with stereotypes defined 
in the Obligations Profile. A detailed definition of OSM is 
provided in Table 4. 
C. LFS Alert (Example) 
An obligation from MS is used to illustrate the modeling of 
OCD and OSM. The LFS Alert states that when a patient's life 
support system fails, an alert should be immediately sent to the 
patient's doctor and to the hospital's biomedical equipment 
technicians within 30 seconds after the failure. The OCD and 
OSM of LFS Alert are shown in Fig 4. In this diagram, we use 
stereotypes of ‹‹Obligation›› and ‹‹System›› in OCD and 
‹‹Initiation›› and ‹‹Violation›› for OSM. Initially, the obligation 
is InActive, but on receiving signal LFSAlert, the state changes 
to Active. If an alarm is generated within 30 seconds, then the 
obligation is in state Fulfilled otherwise the state is Violated. 
TABLE 2. OCLCONSTRAINT ON OBLIGATION STATE MACHINE
V. MODEL-BASED TESTING OF OBLIGATIONS
A. Obligations Profile for Testing 
In this section, we show the mapping of testing concepts in 
OCDs and OSMs that are essential to generate executable test 
cases such as test path, test case, and test data [1, 2]. The 
mapping is shown in Table 5 with examples based on the 
running example. 
B. MBT Tool for Test Case Generation 
The architecture of our prototype tool implemented in Java, 
is shown in Fig 5. It generates executable test cases in Java from 
OCD and OSM. The purpose of the tool is to facilitate our 
evaluation to assess the effectiveness of the generated test cases. 
Other existing MBT tools such as Smartesting [11] and TRUST 
[4] can be extended to support test case generation in the future. 
Our prototype tool has two main components: Test Path 
Generator (TPG) and Test Case Generator (TCG). TPG takes 
OCD and OSM as input and generates a set of test paths based 
on a structural coverage criterion (All Transitions coverage in 
current implementation). Each test path is in Java without actual 
test data and each test path contains Java assertions 
corresponding to OCL state invariants that are transformed using 
Dresden OCL [12]. Each test path is further transformed into a
set of executable test scripts in Java based on test data using Test 
Case Generator. Test data is obtained automatically using 
EsOCL [13], which takes input constraints in OCL and provides 
test data.  
VI. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present the empirical study that have 
been conducted to assess the obligations modeling and testing 
approach we proposed. 
A. Study Design  
 We first present the research questions, and then describe 
the case studies. Last, we define the metrics used to assess our 
approach from different perspectives. 
1) Research Questions:  The two following research 
questions have been studied to assess our approach. 
a) RQ1: Profile Completeness.  Is the Obligations Profile
complete for modeling various types of obligations?  
b) RQ2: Test Cases Effectiveness. What is the 
effectiveness of test cases generated from models using the 
Obligations Profile in terms of its capacity to reveal obligation 
faults? 
Context Obligation inv: 
self.base_Class ->any (b|b.name='StateMachine'). oclAsType 
(uml::StateMachine).region.state 
->select (s|s.name= 'Active')->size() =1 and 
self.base_Class ->any 
(b|b.name='StateMachine').oclAsType(uml::StateMachine).region.state  
->select (s|s.name= 'InActive')->size() =1  
Context Obligation inv: 
self.base_Class->any(c|c.name='Class').oclAsType(uml::Class) ->size()=1 
TABLE 1. OCL CONSTRAINT ON OBLIGATION CLASS
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TABLE 3. OBLIGATION CLASS DIAGRAM
An obligation class diagram is a UML 2.0 Class Diagram stereotyped as ‹‹Obligation›› and it includes the following UML 2.0 Class Diagram elements.
a) C: A set of classes of the following types.
b) Exactly one class that is stereotyped as ‹‹Obligation››. This class has all the attributes, operations, and signal receptions that describe the obligation.
c) An optional class that is stereotyped as ‹‹Human›› or ‹‹System›› to define the user of the obligation.
d) An optional class that is stereotyped as ‹‹Object›› to define the object of the obligation.
e) R: A set of relationships that include all those relationships that show communication between different classes in OCD.
f) OCDs may have signals, enumerations, and data types if required. The signals are modeled to represent an input from environment. Enumerations 
and Data Types are used to model new data types when the primitive types are not sufficient.
  TABLE 4. OBLIGATION STATE MACHINE
An obligation state machine is a UML 2.0 State Machine stereotyped as ‹‹Obligation›› or any of its types from Obligations Profile. OSMs consist of following 
UML 2.0 State Machine elements. 
1. I: An initial state.
2. F: A set of one or more final states. 
3. MS: A set of mandatory states of the following types. 
a) A state InActive in MS that is the state of the obligation before its activation. The state InActive has a state invariant that is defined over one or more 
attributes from ‹‹Obligation›› Class in OCD. The state invariant is an OCL constraint that provides information on the status of the state. An OSM 
has state invariant with each of its state except with UML Pseudostate including initial state and the final state.
A state ‘Active’ in MS that represents the state of obligation when it is activated. The state ‘Active’ has a state invariant that is defined on an attribute 
from ‹‹Obligation›› Class in OCD. 
b) It is mandatory to add either Fulfilled or Violated state or both ’Fulfilled’ and Violated states in an OSM. Each of the state has state invariants. 
4. NS: A set of non-mandatory states includes states of the following types. 
g) A state named Fulfilled or Violated can be part of the set NS only if it does not exist in MS. It is possible to have none of the states from Fulfilled or 
Violated in the set NS when they are already part of MS. 
h) The set NS may have one or more optional states depending on the details of the obligation and choice of the modeler. For example, in order to verify 
access request in a Pre obligation, we added a state named ‘Valid’, similarly more states can be added when there are many constraints. 
5. T: A set of transitions in OSM connecting states in MS or NS with each other. Following are the types of transitions. 
a) A transition from an initial state to InActive state, this transition is without any event, guard, or effect. 
b) One or more transitions from any state (except the initial state) to the final state. 
i) A transition t in set T between states InActive and Active in MS. The transition may contain a trigger such as change event, call event, time event, or 
signal event depending on the obligation. It can be due to an operation call, signal, or a timed attribute from ‹‹Obligation›› class. The trigger is 
stereotyped as ‹‹Initiation››. This transition may have a guard and an effect. 
j) A transition t in T is added from any state in MS (including Active state) to any other state in MS or NS. The transition may have trigger i.e. a change 
event, call event, time event or signal event, it may have a guard and effect. The effect is generally stereotyped as ‹‹Action››.
2) Case Study: We selected four different systems 
implementing various types of obligations. These systems 
include Crisis Management System (CMS) [14], Home Care 
System (HCS) [15], Virtual Meeting System (VMS) [16] and 
Medical System (MS). MS is already presented in Section II as 
a running example.
a) Home Care System (HCS): This system is developed 
as part of the CoPAInS (Conviviality and Privacy in Ambient 
INtelligent Systems) project [15]. 
The HCS is built for different ambient intelligent scenarios, 
some of them are validated by HotCity, the largest WiFi network 
in Luxembourg in the context of CoPAInS. HCS scenarios are 
implemented using the Kevoree [17] platform, which is an open 
source environment that facilitates component-based 
development of distributed systems. We took two scenarios that 
are already implemented in HCS to test their respective 
obligations.  
In the first scenario, HCS is deployed at a patient’s home to 
help in case of an emergency triggered either by sensors or by 
the patient. The HCS forwards the patient’s request message to 
a neighbor or to the ambulance. The neighbor can accept or 
decline the request for help. The neighbor can view the patient’s
current conditions through a camera. In case, no neighbor is 
ready to help, the request for help is sent to an ambulance. 
Different components interact with each other to achieve this 
scenario, such as Emergency Call List (ECL), Remote 
Controller, Door Sensor, Video Camera, Timer, and Smart 
Phone Application. Based on the current available 
implementation of the scenario, we tested five obligations for 
this scenario. In the second scenario, HCS is used for remote 
monitoring of health parameters and uses Electrocardiogram 
(ECG), Pulse Oximeter, and Blood Pressure regulator for regular 
check-ups of patient’s heartbeat, blood oxygen level, and blood 
pressure respectively. In case of any abnormality, HCS sends a 
message to the hospital. The hospital informs doctor and 
responds back to HCS. We modeled and tested ten additional 
obligations of HCS related to this scenario. These two scenarios 
of HCS consist of 3638 lines of Java code. 
b) Virtual Meeting Management System (VMS): VMS 
implements web conferencing services and is a prototype 
system developed in our previous work [16]. A user can 
organize meetings and invite other participants. The organizer 
plans a meeting and sets its main parameters, such as name, 
agenda, and participants. The organizer can appoint a 
moderator for the meeting, who allocates the floor to the 
participant. VMS has 6070 lines of Java code in 134 classes. 
We modeled and tested three obligations of VMS. 
c) Crisis Management System (CMS): CMS [14] is 
designed to help in identifying and handling a crisis such as 
earthquakes, tsunami, floods, terrorist attacks, and accidents. 
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CMS provides ways for communication and coordination 
among different users such as coordinators, hospital staff, 
firemen, and technicians. CMS supports its users in allocating 
necessary resources to handle a crisis and provide access to 
relevant crisis information. Since we do not have access to the  
implementation of CMS, we used the system only for 
evaluating the Obligations Profile. 
All four case studies (notice that MS is presented in 
Section II) are used to evaluate the Obligations Profile by 
modeling their respective obligations, while only HCS and VMS 
are used for testing since their implementation is available. 
3) Case Study Measures:  We defined the following 
measures to address each research question. 
To answer RQ1, we aim to assess the completeness of the 
Obligations Profile. The completeness is assessed based on two 
criteria. The first criterion is an estimate of whether we can 
model all the obligations of the four case studies. This is 
measured as follows:  
TABLE 5    OBLIGATIONS PROFILE FOR TESTING 
Testing Concept Testing Concepts from Obligations Profile Example
Test Path A path in an OSM starting from initial state and ending at the 
final state.
InitialState.Transition1.State1.…FinalState
where, Transitionx consists of an optional Guard as OCL 
constraint, a Trigger, and an optional Effect
Statey: Name  and an OCL constraint specifying state invariant
[Initial State].[InActive]. LFSFails()[Active].after 30 sec 
[Violated].[Final State] in Fig 4.
Test Data Test data is derived from OCL constraints on Guards using 
EsOCL [13] based on RD and ECP with boundary values
t>30 seconds; (Time Event) in Fig 4
RD: t=52
ECP with Boundary Value Analysis Test Data: t<=0 {-5, -1, 0, 1};
t>0 and t<30 {-1, 0, 1, 5, 15, 29, 30, 31}; t>=30 {29, 30, 31, 40}
Test Coverage Structural Coverage: All Transition coverage on an OSM
Data Coverage: One RD value per guard and ECP with boundary 
values from guards for inputs to triggers on transitions.
All Transitions of an OSM shown in Fig 4:
TestPath1= [Initial State].[InActive]. LFSFails()[Active].after 30 
sec [Violated].[Final State]
TestPath2=[InitialState].[InActive]. 
LFSFails()[Active].generateAlert()[Fulfilled].[Final State]
Expected Result OCL constraints as state invariants of states that are transformed 
in to Java assertions using Dresden OCL [12]
State Invariant of InActive State in Fig 4,
Alert:self.status=OStatus::inactive
Pass/Fail Criteria It is true/false as a result of the evaluation of an assertion in Java State Invariant of InActive State in Fig 4
Alert:self.status=OStatus::inactive evaluates to true/false during 
testing
Fig 4 LFS Alert Obligation Class Diagram and Obligation State Machine  
Fig 5 A high-level architecture of test case generation tool
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Second, we measure whether each stereotype defined in the 
Obligations Profile is used at least once for modeling the 
obligations in the four case studies. The purpose of such 
measurement is to assess whether a particular stereotype is 
potentially unnecessary. This is measured as follows:  
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In the current version of the profile, we have defined 19 types 
of stereotypes. If in a case study, we used only five types of 
stereotypes, then Completenessster is 5/19. Completeness of each 
of the four case studies is measured independently using the two 
measures and the overall completeness for each measure is 
obtained by taking the average values over the case studies.  
To answer RQ2, we assess the effectiveness of generated test 
cases using mutation analysis. In our previous work [16], we 
defined various mutation operators for obligations. For 
experiments, we chose Context Management and Obligations 
Management types of mutation operators because they are used 
to mutate the behavior of the obligations. These mutation 
operators include: Context Extension (CE), Context Reduction 
(CR), Context Negation (CN), and Context Swap (C-Swap). The 
CE operator increases the scope of an obligation, CR reduces the 
scope of an obligation, and with CN the context is negated. The 
C-Swap operator is applied by swapping different contexts in an 
obligation. The number of mutants along with mutation 
operators is given in Table 6. 
To answer RQ2, we assess the effectiveness of the generated 
test cases based on the resulting mutation score [18].
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A mutant is said to be killed if at least one test case detects 
the fault seeded in the mutant program. A mutant is said to be 
equivalent if the seeded mutant does not change the behavior of 
the program (the mutant cannot be detected). We measure the 
mutation score for individual mutation operators in addition to 
measuring the overall mutation score, which is the average of all 
the individual mutation scores. 
B. Execution of the Experiment 
1) Modeling of the Case Studies: We modeled all the 
obligations of the four case studies using the Obligations Profile.
As a result, one OCD and one OSM were developed per 
obligation, yielding a total of 47 OCDs and 47 OSMs. On 
average each class diagram has three classes, each state machine 
has four states and five transitions. The models are enriched with 
OCL constraints for two purposes: 1) Automated test data 
generation; 2) Automated test oracles.  
2) Test Case Generation: We developed an MBT test 
case generation tool as discussed in Section V that takes OCD 
and OSM as inputs and generates executable test cases in Java. 
First, test paths are generated by applying the All Transition 
coverage [4] criterion in which each transition in an OSM is 
raversed at least once. In the second step, each test path is 
realized with two test data generation strategies: RD and ECP 
with Boundary Values [1]. Guards on the transitions of OSM 
are used as a basis for test data generation. State invariants in 
OSM are written in OCL and serve as test oracles. State 
invariants written in OCL are transformed into assertions in 
Java code using Dresden OCL [12]. 
3) Test Case Execution: Test case execution is performed 
for two case studies: HCS and VMS. For HCS, in order to 
execute test cases, the behaviors of some of the components 
such as ECG, Pulse Oximeter, Blood Pressure regulator, 
Camera, and Person are simulated in Kevore [17].   
The test case execution for both case studies is carried out in 
the following steps: 1) Mutants are created manually by 
applying the mutation operators discussed earlier. The number 
of mutants applied is shown in Table 6. 2) Test cases with RD
are executed on mutants and results are recorded; 3) Test cases 
with ECP and boundary values are executed on mutants and 
results are recorded. A mutant is killed if an assertion is violated 
during the execution of a test case. Such information is used to 
calculate mutation scores. Overall results of the experiments are 
summarized in Table 9. 
C. Results  
RQ1: The results of modeling nine obligations of MS, fifteen 
obligations of HCS, three obligations of VMS, and twenty 
obligations of Crisis Management System (CMS) [19] are 
summarized in Table 7. 
The completeness of the Obligations Profile in terms of the 
number of obligations (Completenessobj) is 100% for all four 
systems. The completeness of the Obligations Profile in terms 
of the number of applied stereotype types (Completenessster) is 
on average 75%. The highest number of types that was applied 
is 17 out of the 19 that were defined for the HCS as shown in 
Table 7. The description of stereotypes applied for different 
types of obligations is provided in Table 8. 
Addressing RQ 1, our experiment suggests that our profile 
adequately captures all the obligations in four different systems, 
providing evidence that the profile is complete with respect to 
various concepts and stereotypes necessary for modeling 
obligations. It is noticeable in Table 8 that Continuous and Post
obligations occur more rarely. On the contrary, the obligations 
of types Persistent and Fulfillment are the most common ones. 
RQ2: To answer RQ2, we summarize the results in Table 9
based on the following information: number of obligations for 
each system, test data strategy (RD, ECP), number of test paths, 
number of test cases, mutation score for each mutant, and overall 
mutation score. 
From Table 9, we can see that for HCS, with both RD and 
ECP, the mutation score is 100% for the CR type. For the CE 
TABLE 6 NUMBER OF MUTANTS
Mutation Operator # Instances 
CR 7
CE 9
CN 6
C-Swap 22
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and CN types, RD was not able to kill any mutants, whereas ECP 
killed 61% and 60% of mutants, respectively. For C-Swap, RD 
managed to kill 40%, whereas ECP managed to kill 75% of 
mutants. Overall, with RD and ECP we obtained mutation scores 
of 35% and 74%, respectively. For VMS, RD managed to obtain 
80%, 0%, 75%, and 0% for CR, CE, CN, and C-Swap mutants, 
respectively. With ECP, we managed to obtain 100%, 40%,
85%, and 75% for CR, CE, CN, and C-Swap mutants, 
respectively. Overall with RD, we obtained a mutation score of 
39% with RD and 75% with ECP.  
From Table 9, we can observe an improvement in mutation 
scores when using ECP instead of RD, which is a more 
systematic test data strategy as compared to RD. One conclusion 
that we can draw from this observation is that roughly 75% 
(Table 9) of the faults were at the boundaries. The 25% 
remaining faults were probably located outside these
boundaries. Selecting more random (or guided random) values 
outside the boundaries may further improve the mutation scores 
and additional test data strategies will be investigated in the 
future. 
There were no equivalent mutants in our experiment and 
each of the applied mutants changed the behavior of the system 
in some way. However, as shown in Table 9, some mutation 
operators like CE generate hard-to-kill mutants, because they 
extend the condition to which an obligation applies. The C-Swap 
mutation operators are also not killed when a context is swapped 
with another context of larger range. As such, extending a timed-
context would require finding a test that, instead of testing that 
the obligation is working correctly within the nominal 
boundaries, checks that the obligation is not working outside of 
these boundaries. Although we used boundary value analysis 
(ECP), it failed to kill most CE mutants since a larger set of test 
data outside the boundaries is necessary to kill them. From that 
viewpoint, CE mutants require test cases to go from being purely 
nominal/functional to being focused on robustness. 
D. Discussion and Limitations 
1) Modeling of Obligations: Though we have successfully 
applied most of the stereotypes from the Obligations Profile in 
all systems, our profile still has four main limitations that need 
to be addressed in the future. First, obligations may need to be
enforced concurrently with other obligations and/or behavior.
To model such concurrency, orthogonal states in UML2.0 state 
machines may be used, but we need to investigate this using an 
additional case study in the future. Second, in some situations, 
there may be an order in which two or more obligations must 
be enforced. We need to provide modeling support to capture
such ordering between obligations. We will investigate if we 
can use UML activity diagrams to model such ordering among 
various obligations. Third, obligations may interact with each 
other’s, implying that one obligation state machine interacts 
with other obligation states machines. We will investigate in the 
future how we can model such interaction between various 
obligations. Fourth, obligations crosscut functional system  
behavior, thus requiring a modeling approach based on aspect-
orientation. One solution is to make use of UML2.0 
Submachines together with aspect-orientation (e.g., AspectSM 
[20]) to model crosscutting obligations.  
2) Testing of Obligations: Based on the results summarized 
in Table 9, we can see that ECP yields an overall mutation 
scores of 74% and 75% for the two case studies, respectively.
We need to define more focused and sophisticated test 
strategies to further improve the effectiveness of obligation 
testing using the Obligations Profile. We will investigate the 
use of more advanced techniques such as constraint solving and 
search-based algorithms in our future work [13]. 
E. Threats to Validity 
1) Modeling of Obligations: As with most empirical studies 
in software engineering, our main conclusion validity threat is 
related to the sample size on which we base our analysis. In our 
study, to assess the applicability and completeness of our 
profile, we modeled four different systems with diverse types 
of obligations.  
Our main threat of construct validity is that we were not able 
to investigate all features of the Obligations Profile (e.g., all 
types of stereotypes), due to the nature of the case studies. We 
will model additional case studies in the future to investigate if 
the unused stereotypes are really needed to model obligations.  
The modest size of our case studies can be seen as a threat to 
external validity. Notice that we used four different systems (one 
of them real) and modeled 47 different obligations. We believe 
that these four case studies provide initial evidence about the 
applicability of the approach that should be confirmed by 
additional larger case studies. 
2)  Testing of Obligations: One of the main construct 
validity threats is related to the selection of mutation operators 
to assess the effectiveness of the generated test cases. To 
alleviate it, we selected already published mutation operators 
[16] for obligations and mutated the case studies using those 
operators.Some of the mutation operators defined in [16] are not 
used in our study since they have no impact on the behavior of 
obligations and are specific to access control rules such as 
Entity Assignment, Rule Deletion and Hierarchal mutation 
TABLE 7 OBLIGATIONS PROFILE COMPLETENESS
Syste
m # Ob OC (%)
Overall 
OC (%)
US/TS SC 
(%)
Overall 
SC (%)
MS 9 100 100 14/19 74 75
CMS 20 100 16/19 84
HCS 15 100 17/19 89
VMS 3 100 10/19 53
* OC= Completenessobj, SC= Completenessster US=Unique Stereotypes, TS=Total 
Stereotypes, Ob=Obligations
TABLE 8 RESULTS OF MODELING OBLIGATIONS FROM DIFFERENT 
SYSTEMS*
Type # Instances Stereotypes Used
Fulfillment 8,9, 4,0 Obligation, Fulfillment, Initiation, Violation, Action, Context, Sanction, Human, System
Persistent 5, 1,1,0 Obligation, Persistent, Initiation, Violation, Action, Human, System
Pre 2, 0,1,1 Obligation, Pre, Initiation, Object, System
On 2, 0,1,1 Obligation, On, Initiation, Human
Negation 3, 1,1,0 Obligation, Negation, Initiation, Context, System
Post 0, 1,1,1 Post, Initiation
Continuous 0,2,0,0 Obligation, Continuous, Context
*In the # Instances column, w, x, y, z refers to number of obligations of a particular 
type in CMS (w), HCS (x), MS (y) and VMS (z), respectively. 
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operators. Moreover, we have tried to use all the mutation 
operators that were applicable on obligations, including  context 
–based operators.    
Another threat to the validity of testing obligations is related 
to the effects of experimental settings such as the types of 
obligations in both case studies, the number mutation operators 
selected, and the coverage criteria for test cases, which could 
have visible effects on fault detection effectiveness. The type of 
data coverage in test cases can impact the results in terms of 
mutants killed. We have improved data coverage from RD to 
ECP with boundary value analysis, however more sophisticated 
data coverage techniques could significantly impact results  
With respect to conclusion validity threats, we based our 
results on two systems: HCS (a real system) and VMS. We have 
tried to cover different case studies in order to capture and test 
multiple types of obligations. However, the fact that only two 
systems could be tested has decreased the number of obligations 
types used for testing. To improve the confidence in the results, 
we intend to perform more thorough evaluation by defining 
more advanced testing strategies and additional case studies in 
the future 
VII. RELATED WORK
The work on modeling obligations can be categorized into 
two main types. In the first type, obligations are modeled using 
different formalisms such as predicate logic [21], Lamport’s 
temporal logic (TLA) [19], logic rules [5], and set theory [22].
The second type of works focuses on defining a dedicated 
language for obligations modeling such as xSPL [23],
Obligations Specification Language (OSL) [24], Rei [25], and 
Ponder Specification Language [26]. Obligations are modeled 
for several purposes such as static analysis [5, 22, 27], platform 
for the enforcement of obligations policies with underlying 
system [21, 23], state-based modeling for verification [28], and 
software testing [29, 30].  There are also works on using UML 
to model access control infrastructure that does not include the 
modeling of obligations [31, 32] 
 Some contributions in the literature have focused on the 
model-based testing of obligations. They model obligations 
using different formalisms such as Extended Finite State 
Machines (EFSM) [29] and Petri Nets (PrT) [30]. In the work of 
Mallouli and Cavalli [29], EFSMs are used to model access rules 
and obligations with the objective to identify test objectives. 
However, they do not specify constraints on obligations, in 
particular timing constraints. Xu et al. [30] use PrT as test model, 
generate test inputs, and use them for automated test generation 
[33]. They consider timing constraints as well as negative 
obligations. Elrakaiby et al. [16] define mutant operators for 
mutation analysis of obligations. A number of works in the 
literature focus on testing access control rules [34-36] but do not 
include obligations.  
Our work on modeling obligations, using the Obligations 
Profile, makes a number of contributions when compared to the 
above literature. First, it provides a solution based on UML, thus 
making it possible to use UML commercial and open source 
tools. This in turn is likely to increase adoption by practitioners. 
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, no existing work 
provides a systematic and comprehensive modeling 
methodology to support automated testing. 
VIII.CONCLUSION
Model-based testing (MBT) is increasingly used for 
automated testing as it is supported by a number of open source 
and commercial tools. However, MBT relies on behavior 
descriptions that must be at a sufficient level of detail to enable 
test automation. Obligations are mandatory actions that 
guarantee the security of the system if implemented correctly. 
To support MBT for obligations, a dedicated and systematic 
modeling approach is required. This paper addresses this 
challenge by proposing the Obligations Profile, extending the 
concepts of UML Class and State Machine Diagrams. We 
defined constraints on the Obligations Profile using the Object 
Constraint Language (OCL), which can be enforced by UML 
modeling tools and guide the user in following a systematic 
methodology for modeling obligations. We assess the 
completeness and applicability of the profile by modeling 47 
different obligations for four different systems. The results 
showed that our profile is sufficiently complete to model the 
various types of obligations present in our case studies, though 
some stereotypes defined in the profile remained unused. 
Since the main target of the Obligations Profile is automated 
testing, we provide the mapping of its concepts to testing 
concepts that are necessary for automated test case generation.
We developed a prototype tool that takes in input UML class 
diagrams and UML state machines, on which the Obligations 
Profile is applied, and that generates executable test cases. To 
assess the effectiveness of the generated test cases, we 
performed mutation analysis and results showed that on average 
the generated test cases managed to kill 75% of the mutants. 
Though encouraging, the results suggest to define more focused 
test strategies to further improve fault detection effectiveness.  
In the future, we plan to define more sophisticated test 
strategies by combining search-based software engineering and 
constraint solving to further improve fault detection 
effectiveness. Moreover, we plan to integrate the use of existing 
MBT tools such as TRUST [6] or Smartesting [7] to support the 
application of the Obligations Profile for test case generation. 
TABLE 9 TEST RESULTS*
System # Obligations Test Data
Strategy
#Test Path #Test Cases MS (%) OMS (%)
CR CE CN C-Swap
HCS 5 RD 8 16 100 0 0 40 35
ECP 8 37 100 61 60 75 74
VMS 3 RD 4 8 80 0 75 0 39
ECP 4 21 100 40 85 75 75
*CR=CONTEXT REDUCTION, CE= CONTEXT EXTENSION, CN= CONTEXT NEGATION, C-SWAP= CONTEXT SWAP, MS= MUTATION SCORE, OMS= OVERALL MUTATION SCOR
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